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We present a study of ownership and governance structure in the growing Chinese entrepreneurial 
SMEs sector. The study examines the structures that are embedded in the traditional Chinese values 
and culture, as well as the institutional environment for Chines SME’s and the limitation they present 
towards the growth SMEs in China. Our findings suggest that Chinese SME ownership, and ownership 
transition appears to be stable and supportive of SME growth. The external institutional environment, 
however, is a limiting factor for the growth of Chinese SME. This results in the structure of dominant 
shareholder that seems to be a suitable construct for most SMEs under the current institutional 
environment of China. The first phase Chinese SME’s go through is to define unequivocally the role 
and the responsibility in the organization of family members. We conclude this paper with the 
implications and suggestions for future research.   
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1. Introduction  
In smaller companies, the entrepreneur is often the figure that guarantees the critical competencies: the 
coalition coincides with him or her (Smith &Miner, 1983). As long as the entrepreneur’s physical and 
mental resources can handle management complexity, the governance structure is not a relevant issue. 
In fact, the entrepreneur works out the strategic and control functions as well as the synthesis of 
interests,  those social and economic networks that are vital to the company (Ward, 1991, 1997). 
The need for development of the business generates the delegation process. A key internal constraint 
for the growth of SMEs is a reluctance or inability of owner managers to diversity control over 
business functions to professional managers (Storey, 1994). When this resistance is overcome, the 
coalition increases and the first governance issues arise (Gubitta and Gianecchini, 2002). In China, the 
ownership structure and transition cannot be taken for granted to be a natural process. After a period of 
rapid development, Chinese SMEs are facing growth issues associated with introducing capital and 
managerial resources, which can be rooted form the improper governance structure.  
  This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of the ownership structure of SMEs under the 
institutional environment of China, which has a long history but scarcity of open market economic 
experience. The following research questions were formulated for the study: 
 
-Does firm Ownership structure influence the growth of Chinese SME’s? 
-Do changes in ownership pose difficulties for fast growing SME’s?   
-What is the role, impact of the institutional environment in China on SME growth? 
 
  Reliable information on the problems and constraints facing Chinese SMEs is difficult to find from 
existing data sources. We therefore carried six interviews, and this paper is based on the results of 
these interviews. Nearly all of the enterprises in our sample admit that many management problems 
can probably be traced back to highly centralized ownership structure. But the process of ownership 
diversification is almost slack which doesn’t coincide with the rapid development of SMEs. 
  In this paper, we think that institutional change is crucial and determinant to the evolution of 
ownership structure of Chinese SMEs. We specify the settings of China’s business tradition, values 
and institutional environment, and explain why the existing of dominant shareholder is a suitable 
selection for most of the China's SMEs, which can somewhat, explain the gap between the practice 
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2. Literature Review 
 Mainstream research on corporate governance is based on the separation of ownership (shareholders 
on the one side) and control (managers on the other side) in the large , publicly traded firms where 
ownership is distributed among an extremely large number of an anonymous shareholders (Berle 
&Means , 1932). The SMEs were always regarded as generally "classical enterprise", in which the 
owner and the operator were not separable, so the Corporate governance of SMEs was neglected in 
reason. (Ouyang wenhe and ) 
  Along with the content of corporate governance continuously extending, the corporate governance of 
SMEs were getting increased attention. (  ) Whereas, most SMEs research focuses on how to improve 
the decision-making process and ensure coordination, then the executive board issues are often 
created. (    ) As for the Change in ownership, are always not the emphasis of research. Because this 
process can be moderate, for example in the internal transfer of shares among the family members, or 
they are more considerable when a stake of company’s proprietorship shifts to external investors or 
when a separation between ownership and management effectively takes place within the firm 
(Schillaci and Faraci, 1999). Among these few but valuable literature, Paolo.G and Martina.G (2002) 
utilize the New Theory of Property Rights to analyze corporate governance models in SMEs and offer 
a definition of flexibility of the coporate governance systems and organizational structure. Schillaci 
C.E. and Faraci R. (1999) found that changes in firm family ownership are not homogenous and the 
consequences of such modifications are also different in terms of governance devices, decision-
making process and strategic competitiveness. They defined such patterns of change as “institutional 
transition” processes due to external and internal pressure for organizational change of SMEs. 
Although these literatures enlighten the research on the process of ownership transition, the above-
described theories partly lose their strength when applied to the China's SMEs because there exist 
huge difference between China and western countries in external mechanisms for corporate 
governance.   
  In China, the majority of the corporate governance literature focus on the large listed companies, 
there is a dearth of research on smaller organizations. (    ) However, Ouyang and Du (2005) compare 
the corporate governance of SMEs between European Union and China. They summarize the character 
difference, which need to further empirical tested. Wang and Cui provide and test an evolution model 
of corporate governance for private enterprise. They conclude governance system in a way that fits the 
specific organizational context and use institutional theory to help explain the ownership structure of 
China’s SMEs. Deng and Yu (2003) analysis the ownership structure changes of China's private 
enterprises and give some advise on how to built a dynamic ownership. But all these researches 
seldom ground their theory on empirical test and hence extract concrete results. So there is still much 
room to improve our understanding of this changing process for the growing SMEs. This paper pays 
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attention to the ownership structure change of China's SMEs from an institutional and transaction cost 
aspect, which can better understand the problems facing the growing SMEs. 
  The reminder of this paper starts with a descriptions of the ownership situation in the China’s SMEs 
as a governance mechanism. The next section we analysis the institutional environment of China, 
which can explain the emergence of dominant shareholder of SMEs, and followed by concluding 
remarks and future research directions. 
 
3. Problematic Ownership Structure in China's SMEs  
 
3.1. Existence of Dominant Shareholders 
  Limited liability companies registered before the adoption of new Company Law in 2006 are 
required to have 2-50 investors, whereas, according to A Report on the Development of China’s 
Private Enterprises (2002), over one seventh private limited liability companies virtually have only 
one investor, and it’s so common a situation that the biggest shareholder owns more than 90% of an 
enterprise.  
  Three types of situations caused this. The first is the natural outcome when start-up process began. In 
China, when SMEs get started, they tend to run the business in the form of a limited liability 
enterprise, through which on the one hand they can fully exploit the rules of limited liability to avoid 
operating risks, on the other hand, they can improve the image of the firm. In order to meet legal 
requirements this single investor runs a virtually one-man company within the system of “nominal 
shareholders” where other shareholders are usually the trustees of the investment of the real 
shareholder. It means there is only one investor, which is in turn creates several problems. Besides the 
dissensions between the real owner and the nominal shareholders, it is clearly that all the corporate 
governance mechanism means nothing to a virtually wholly funded enterprise.      
The second situation is that family members start up the business together. In China, there is a 
traditional cultural propensity to do business with family members and those in the same region with 
whom one has Guanxi, or with those outside with whom one has no connections but can trust (Chen, 
2001;Tedding, 1990).Placing their ownership under a special relationship (such as blood, kinship or 
geopolitics) and from the very beginning, there hasn’t been a clear line of ownership among family 
members. Family members usually put their family disciplines first instead of market rules. It means 
there is a tendency of centralization of management by the powerful man within the family. Yet a 
long-term development requires specific allocation of property and interest for different players，even 
we see the entire family as a single party of interest. The result of balancing each other is always the 
isolation of ownership or consolidation of despotism. 
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The third situation is that in the start-up there are several real investors sharing ownership in 
accordance with their investment. But with the firm growing and the not-so-clear separation of 
responsibilities and rights at beginning, they gradually go different ways in evaluating their 
capabilities and contributions, which will surely generate various conflicts of interest among the 
shareholders. Their ownership shares are approximately the same, as a result of game among the 
shareholders, the organization will split or some shareholders will quit. Centralization of the 
ownership is unavoidable, which will lead an existence of dominant shareholders. In the economic 
transition period, the disorder of spirit values will prick up this trend.  
The emergence of a dominant shareholder affect the corporate governance of SMEs: the supervisory 
systems such as board of directors established merely meet legal requirements, and there is hardly any 
evidence of supervisory boards or non-executive board playing a proper role. Based on this kind of 
ownership structure, it inclines to cultivate an atmosphere of autocratic decision-making style and lead 
the big shareholders to seize the territory of small ones, which will hamper the introducing of new 
investors. This will obviously result in the slack of ownership transition. 
 
3.2. Involvement of Family Members 
  Even though some China’s SMEs are not textbook family-owned as far as ownership is concerned, 
they still place family members on different levels of the organization. For important positions such as 
finance and purchase, family members will be preferred for the reason that there is usually business 
“privacy” within the firm. The newcomer is likely to take this “privacy” as hostage, which makes the 
surplus loss of agency cost highly unstable and more risky. (Li and Ren, 2002）By choosing a 
trustworthy family member to take the job, the firm found the best way to reduce agency cost. So far 
as common positions, if the applicants are rather similar with each other, those from within the family 
are also preferred. However, it is an innate problem for family enterprises to be troubled by nepotism 
and xenophobia. Family members take the dominant role in their enterprises, which lagged the level of 
specialized management. 
  There is another particular case called the quasi-family phenomenon. In China almost any developed 
SMEs has a group of loyal employees who have been following the boss for several years and are 
completely familiar with everything in the company. However, although they occupy important 
positions, they usually fail to change or adapt to the growing business, which makes them parties of 
vested interest. On the one hand, they hold back the company from moving forward, but on the other 
hand, they maintain it to be what it is.  
  In a sum, many China’s SMEs are full of patriarchal atmosphere and far away from the modern 
company culture. This hampers the process of opening important positions to professional managers. 
Even if the professional managers were introduced, they must pay more attention to solving the 
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conflicts among parties of interest. Nevertheless, the fact that so many parties are seriously involved 
makes this goal hard to achieve in daily management, reducing or completely counteracting the power 
of the manager. The ownership changes caused by managerial stock ownership are very difficult to 
realize in Chinese SMEs. 
 
3.3. Interposition of Rent-seeking beneficiaries 
In economics, rent seeking is the process by which an individual or firm seeks to profit through 
manipulation of the economic environment rather than through trade and the production of added 
wealth. The phrase rent seeking itself, however, was coined in 1973 by Anne Krueger in a paper. In 
transitioning economy rent seeking has become a serious social problem caused by a lack of power-
balancing mechanism and the bureaucratic interference.  
  There are many ways of rent-seeking, legal and illegal. Companies can strive for favorable treatment 
from the government by way of negotiation and lobbying, or preserve their monopoly with special 
policies. The personal capabilities and social relationship of the enterprise owner will determine the 
firm ability to gather scarce resource, ultimately affecting its business performance. At the same time, 
some officials abuse their power to set up rent to exact fees or collectively carry out bribery activities. 
Under the circumstance in China, the rent seeking beneficiaries are not only government officials. In 
fact, they involve all individuals who have a say in resource allocation during the transition period, 
including the authorities in state-owned financial institutions and supervisory bodies, their relatives, 
classmates, and friends who all play a role in how to divide economic resources. 
  There is an ongoing trend in the corporate governance of China's SMEs that it gradually moves from 
the family-owned governance to rent-seeking beneficiaries aligned-governance. This is partly because 
the owners of SMEs are usually feeling the heavy pressure of the external environment, therefore they 
want to internalize or institutionalize the rent-seeking forces from outside in order to form joint 
governance with all parties of interest. (Ouyang, 2005) In another word, these entrepreneur actually 
are willing to let rent-seeking benieficiaries with the power of resource allocation be the shareholders, 
even though the shares might be given for free. However, this kind of shareholding is not recognized 
legally and can be treated only with secrecy in the form of private promises from the owner to the 
rent-seeking beneficiaries. Accordingly, the money spent to cope with the rent-seeking beneficiaries 
should be included in the business cost of the entire enterprise, which cannot be audited normally. The 
rent-seeking beneficiaries’ shares are often registered under the name of the owner and this secret 
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4. Institutional Environment for China’s SMEs 
Institutions are "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990). Davis and North (1971) divide the new 
institutional economics into two parts--the institutional environment and the institutions of 
governance. While the institutional environment is the set of fundamental political, social and legal 
ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution, an institutional 
arrangement is an arrangement between economic units that governs the ways in which these units can 
cooperate and/or compete. And what is the relationship between the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements? Williamson (1991) argues that we can treat the institutional environment 
as a set of parameters, changes in which elicit shifts in the comparative costs of governance. That is, A 
governance model should be defined as an articulated system, consistent with formal and informal 
rules. Peng and Health (1996) argued that understanding the wider institutional environment is crucial 
to comprehending the rules under which firms must operate. Many of the shortcomings in the actual 
practice of corporate governance in China derive from weaknesses in the institutional environment as 
well as from peculiar cultural traditions. Before we attempt to solve the problems of SME deeply 
rooted from ownership structure, we need to analyze the Chinese institutional environment first. 
 
4.1. Formal institution 
4.1.1.Weakness in legal system 
  A sound and strictly enforced legal system is one of the critical prerequisites of a successful 
transition of ownership structure in Chinese SMEs.  
  There still exists some unsound part of legal system lies in the motive of the legislation. The first is 
Company Law. The need of nonstate actors for a convenient form in which to conduct business 
occupies a very low priority in the minds of state policymakers, and the Company Law is thus clearly 
concerned more with regulating and suppressing than with fostering and nurturing. Probably the most 
common complaint about the old Company Law adopted in 1994 is that the limited liability companies 
should have 2-50 shareholders, who must debate policy at shareholder meetings and vote after serious 
consideration of the issues. This regulation accords with neither the business reality nor the national 
customs, which can’t be executed root and branch because of the high transaction costs. Therefore it 
brings about a lot of interference as mentioned above. However, the new Chinese Company Law 
allows people to open one-investor limited liability companies. It will be more suitable for the Chinese 
SMEs.  
  Another prominent problem is the lack of a well defined property rights-based contract law. Nee 
(1992) observed that hybrids in reforming state socialist societies lack a well-specified structure of 
property rights and, effective autonomy. As it is put by Professor Zhang Weiying, “a stable and clear 
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institution of property right is the foundation of trust" (2003). Therefore, the socialist hybrids must 
rely more on personal ties than on legal contracts to provide assurances that the terms of a transaction 
will be met by both parties (Carroll, Goodstein, and Gyenes, 1988). Poorly defined property rights will 
further increase the transaction costs. 
  The judicial efficiency and independence of judiciary are also seriously disturbing the China’s SMEs, 
which means the power to enforce the contract is weak. Even if a contract is complete, high 
transaction costs still occur when enforcement is not sufficiently effective. When disputes emerge, 
both the financial and mental lawsuit cost is very high. 
  In China, a market-oriented reform only started about two decades ago. Under the central planning 
system, as Kornai (1992) points out, with plenty of bureaucratic controls and regulations, there was 
little need for formal laws to define exchange relationships among economic actors. Undoubtedly, 
conducting administration according to laws and sticking to rules represents a rather rigid challenge to 
the Chinese governments at various levels that are accustomed to issuing administrative commands 
and unfamiliar with law-based administration.  
  SMEs operating in an environment characterized by property unprotected and contract uncertainty 
where the legal framework for the enforcement of contracts is not well developed, hence the 
importance of trust embedded in particularistic exchange relations such as kinship or ethnicity in 
protecting contracts. 
 
4.1.2. Scarcity of Capital and Managerial Resources 
  It is a known fact that it’s difficult for Chinese SMEs to do their financing. One of the reasons for 
this comes from the nature of SMEs. It’s an international economic phenomenon because SMEs have 
weak governance structure, inadequate information sharing, high business risks, shortage of necessary 
mortgages that easily lead to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
  Another reason is that the Chinese banking system, although considerably reformed in a number of 
respects, is still not a real commercial banking system and nor does it constitute an efficient debt 
market (Yu and Ju, 1999). Although we have witnessed some substantial improvement in the 
marketization of interest rates, this floating range is still not enough to make up for the risks it brings 
that can only be compensated by methods such as compensatory surplus, charges incurred by deferral, 
etc. Joining the list are the extremely complicated application procedures with its prolonged time, 
which make the implicit cost of SMEs carrying out financing skyrocket. Besides, the two-track 
transformation and the ownership discrimination it gives birth to have made it impossible for private 
enterprises, the majority of SMEs, to get necessary financial support, outrageously stimulating the 
rent-seeking motives from within the banking industry. 
 
10
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/7-2
Ownership Structure of Chinese SMS’s and the Challenges it Presents to Their Growth 
 
  Meanwhile, in fields such as credit underwriting mechanism, venture capital and property trade 
market, they are still not mature enough, which makes these areas play a negligible role in their 
economic activities.  
  All these restrctions mentioned above have seriously narrowed down the avenues for the SMEs of 
financing, bringing about a vicious cycle caused by internal financing and close ownership.  
  What’s more, the market of professional managers is a very special kind of human resources market. 
On some level, this can be seen as a labor market of “professional” entrepreneurs, involving the 
discrimination and motivation of the entrepreneurial spirit and the re-allocation of surplus rights of the 
company. This market in China is highly unstable because the cost of them transferring from 
ownership to management is rather low. Another problem is that when the ownership structure of the 
firm is not successfully improved, and the motivation and regulation mechanisms not established, 
there is a huge risk in transferring the administrative power because the manager may make full use of 
the resources to set up a network of internal control. 
  Due to the lack of formal institutional support in capital market and managerial resources, there are 
very high and sometimes even unconquerable barriers to hierarchies in the Chinese economy. Peng 
and Heath (1996) have observed that firms in planned economies in transition do try to internalize the 
transactions.  
 
4.1.3. Lack of Market Competition Rules 
  One of the impressive achievements of the Chinese reforms is that market competitive forces have 
been introduced into the economic development. However to the date Chinese market is is still not 
completely open for competition, Many firms can partially disclose, distort, and even forge 
information for transaction or taxation purpose with low risk of being caught. Furthermore, the overall 
market condition has been unstable and often been exposed to government interventions. In addition, a 
stable supply of many raw material can not be easily guaranteed, which increases uncertainty and 
adversely affects the production of many other firms. 
  As nonstate owned enterprises, the SMEs find themselves trapped in a rather weak position. Owners 
of these companies are usually not able to cope with the excruciating restrictions only by themselves. 
They must carry out business activities with the help of external forces and their connections with high 
powers in order to acquire scarce resources or occupy the status of monopoly or evade necessary 
taxations. Sporadic opportunists will not pose a grave threat for the overall mechanism, yet the whole 
market as an opportunist will virtually abolish all the rules. Gresham’s Law has it that “bad money 
drives good money out of circulation,” which is exemplified in all the unethical and illegal means 
adopted by Chinese companies to fight for a fair competitive status, ultimately, in return, instigating 
the rent-seekers, destroying market orders and holding the enterprises as hostages who are being 
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blackmailed of their “business privacy”. This reason can to some extent explain the irregular behavior 
of SMEs on their fast track of growth that even if the administrative level is becoming an obstacle, the 
company is still reluctant to open critical positions to professional managers from the market and to 
replace the old employees who are no longer suitable for their jobs.  
Ignorance of legal restrictions and irregular methods certainly provide a amount of support for the 
company to reap profits in the short-term, but their messing with market rules and alternating the 
foundation of cooperation have buried time bombs for their development in the long run, and in the 
mean time, set a huge obstacle for the transformation of ownership structure faced with unstable and 
unfathomable risks in the future.  
  Market economy is often called nomocracy economy because only through observing rules and being 
honest can business efficiency be improved. Obviously, market economy requests strict prevention 
against cheating behaviors in commodity production and exchanges. Therefore, the government 
undertakes a heavy supervision and administration task of maintaining market order. 
 
4.2. Informal Institution 
  Cultural characteristics play an important role in inducing evolution of corporate governance (or 
institutional change). Especially China is an ancient country with over 5,000 years of civilization 
history and its history and culture tradition is completely different from that of modern western 
countries. Traditional Chinese values have an enormous influence on establishing formal institutions. 
 
4.2.1. One-man and Insider Rule 
  Ever since Liang Shuming raised the idea of “ethical society” and Fei Xiaotong the theory of 
“Chinese hierarchy”, the academic circle has basically come to a conclusion that traditionally China 
has long been affected by Confucian value system, institutional change has vivid family 
characteristics. A clan is a group of people of the same ancestor and common estate that are based on 
confidence, acceptability, construction and support between each other, and conformity that is 
rationalized genealogically (Mofei, 1994).  The nucleate and essence of clan power is paternity. 
Patriarchy is based upon paternity and the amplification and extension of it. It is an ingrained tradition 
of recognizing the norm of an authoritarian leader within the organization or clan. 
  Chinese patriarchy not only agrees to the need of highly centralized despotism polity, but also gets 
the support of traditional Confucian cultural value system that is penetrated so that it is normalized, 
legalized and theorized. 
  Prevalent also in Chinese culture is a tradition of insiders vs. outsiders with a built-in convention of 
secrecy among insiders. Family or clan members, as “insiders”, are expected to bear collective 
responsibility in promoting and safeguarding the interests of the unit. The interests of outsiders are 
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either secondary or irrelevant. Conflicts within the unit are resolved not through the intervention of an 
external agency, but internally and confidentially through arbitration by the clan elder or recognized 
leader of the organizational unit. Actual Chinese corporate governance practice appears to be replicate 
Chinese social, cultural and political traditions. When such an ethic conception diffused and 
penetrated into social and political fields, a social control system characterized by patriarchal clan and 
family system, commonly known as individual governance and ethic governance, was formed. 
Therefore for a long time, in China social conflicts were mainly adjusted on the basis of Confucian 
ethics and morals and laws just played a secondary role.  
  Under this culture, the SMEs are always operating on the bases of family authority and internal 
loyalty. If the corporate governance is not restructure yet, handing over the control right means 
transferring the authority which will be utilized by the manager to form a insider control.  
 
4.2.2. Society of Guanxi  
  The Chinese is a nationality paying much attention to sentiment. Today, people still cherish the ties 
with family members, friends, and native people. Emphasizing sentiment tends to sacrifice rationality 
because sentiment is irrational in nature. This creates some disharmony with the rationality, order, and 
nomocracy requested by industrialization. 
  Having been living over ages in the traditional atmosphere of a pragmatic culture and the “society of 
guanxi” in everyday life, the Chinese has an apparent behaving pattern that they pay much more 
attention to handling communications and relations with other people in a flexible way rather than 
those strict disciplines. This mental and behavioral pattern will have a huge impact on the ongoing 
establishment of a legal system for the market economy. 
  Guanxi literally means "relationships". Yang (1994) states that“Guanxi can also hasthe sense of 
'social connections.” In the Chinese business world, however, it is also understood as the network of 
relationships among various parties that cooperate together and support one another. The development 
of a guanxi web depends upon whether some attributes or a guanxi base e.g. clanships; friendships, 
schoolmates, teachers and students exist among individuals. The extent of guanxi cultivation among 
individuals depends upon their positioning within a frame that is based on some social unit 
classifications. The social units may be family, work units and social network. Outright bribery may 
be good enough to get a business transaction done on a one-off basis, but it cannot produce 
interpersonal attraction that is defined as emotional relationship (Simons et al 1970, Tsang 1998). One 
of the major purposes is to generate “ganqing” and become an insider of a group; then all deals 
become easy. 
  “Guanxi” cannot be simply attributed origin to cultural factors such as Confucianism or collectivism. 
Xin and Pearce (1996) clearly argue that guanxi is the product of a specific institutional environment. 
 
13
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/7-2
Ownership Structure of Chinese SMS’s and the Challenges it Presents to Their Growth 
 
They suggest that Chinese private-company executives operating without the structural protection of 
governmental support develop guanxi as a substitute for the formal institutional enviorenment. 
  Purely relying on guanxi to establish a long-term business relationship may be risky. The most 
critical problem exists when the cooperation is not a team at all, but rather a constellation of persons 
pursuing their own benefits. In the face of major environmental shifts, such teams are slow and 
generally maladaptive. Guanxi may even become worthless or turn into a liability once the partner 
loses power.  
  When a society such as the current Chinese business society is becoming more and more mobile, 
tight and extensive networks will be more difficult to establish and maintain. Loosening networks will 
induce more opportunism, since deviations are more difficult to be detected, and social sanctions are 
more difficult to be carried out effectively. Under such conditions, growing SMEs will face more 
difficulty in establishing and maintaining, which will inevitably entail higher transaction costs. 
 
4.2.3. Trust-based Informal Contract 
  Chinese culture roots from Confucian value system, therefore it embodies characteristics such as the 
family and guanxi value that are constricted by informal institution of a vertical social structure 
(informal contracts); while western culture is based on individualism of liberty and equality, therefore 
emphasizes more on formal constrictions (formal contracts).  
  According to Hayek’s view (Hayek ,1945) the information structure of low context culture 
corresponds to the characters of knowledge of specific time and place and thus its content lacks 
systematization and normalization and is difficult to communicate in words . Only when the specific 
situation of that time and that place can the information be better understood and grasped.  
  Modern corporation theory views corporation and market as a series of contracts. The economic 
body’s trade behavior (approach to the market or firm) is decided by transaction costs. The choosing 
of the ways to organize the corporation or market is based on its transaction cost. For Chinese, because 
of low normalization and decentralization, the information communication is severely constricted, 
which makes their business is usually carried out within a rather small circle where most of their trade 
partners are acquaintances. 
  Trust fills in the gap created by contractual incompleteness; this means that even though the terms of 
a contract can be ambiguous__ that is , they do not clearly explain rights and duties of the parties in 
different situations _trust overcomes this incompleteness and the parties behave as if the contract was 
exhaustive (Easterbrook & Eischel, 1991). Trades based on personal relationship that don’t need 
official contracts are usually very efficient, so the reduced transaction cost within a small circle is 
acquired. When doing business on a large open market, Chinese are not used to bonding with outsiders 
and strangers for friendly business connections. The Chinese are not good at establishing a non-
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personal, contract-based, equal-footed and official cooperative relationship, which is reflected in the 
field of internal construction where Chinese companies don’t do well in professional management and 
the establishment of a large expandable and replicable modern bureaucratic organization.  
  Along with the transitioning Chinese economy, the definition and protection of property rights is an 
expensive process that needs a long way to go. In fact, what the challenge we are really facing with is 
to set up a foundation of trust and transform our company culture from guanxi-oriented to rules-
oriented. China's special institutional environment--there are high barriers to both markets and 
hierarchies for SMEs. The development of SMEs cannot escape from the Chinese culture and the 
current institutions.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
  We have analyzed the phenomenon of China's SMEs from an institutional perspective and with a 
focus on ownership and governance. Under certain conditions, the institutional support for both 
market transactions and internal hierarchies is so underdeveloped that the transaction costs become 
prohibitively expensive. Uncertainty has been deemed one of the main obstacles to change the 
ownership structure of SMEs.  
As a result of all these causes, the private-owned enterprises have chosen the highly centralized family 
style to be their ownership capital structure. Property right is the result instead of the precondition of 
the game (Wang Dingding, 1996). the centralization of ownership is not only the start point of many 
Chinese SMEs but also the result of the SMEs trying to economize on transaction costs under the 
Chinese institutional environment. Change in ownership is a dynamic evolution, which, however, is 
restrained by external institutional environment to appear to be ultra-stable. The changes in the 
corporate governance system are often more slow than necessary and, in some cases, are not even 
made at all. This mismatch, even if transitory, could stop the growth of family firms (paolo Gubitta, 
Martina Gianecchini). 
 
  In situations where legal and market institutions are still relatively underdeveloped and the playing 
field may not be level, and where the external mechanisms of corporate governance are subsequently 
fairly weak and ineffectual, these internal safeguards are particularly important. So we should improve 
the ownership structure of China’s SMEs by combining the modern market rules and the traditional 
Chinese culture. 
  First, it must be admitted there is much difference in knowledge and capability among people. 
Individual should be stimulated to start a new enterprise and be encouraged to utilize all of accessible 
resources abiding by the law. The Existence of dominant shareholder may be the suitable arrangement 
for most of the SMEs in China. 
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  Secondly, be sure not to consider the family firm is lagged, the ownership and property rights should 
be unambiguous: they ought to be owned by clearly defined (legal) persons. It means that there are 
clearly identifiable residual claimants bearing residual risks among related family members. 
  Thirdly, the work should center on improving the internal management of SMEs and training a lot of 
talents with high expertise so that the SMEs can have higher competitiveness. SMEs should rely on 
not the network-based but the rule-based development. 
  All in all, Adjust government functions to provide a sound regulatory environment for SMEs. In this 
stage, to great extent the development of Chinese economy still relies on the depth of system reform 
and the basic symbols will be government function transition.  
  Although we have analyzed the SMEs’ ownership structure in Chinese context, much work remains 
ahead. We have examined primarily from a new institutional and transaction cost perspective. By 
incorporating knowledge views into our theory, we may be able to better explain the complexity and 
richness of ownership transition. An empirical test is also in badly need to be introduced. Then we can 
examine how and in what situations ownership centralization of SMEs is generated, developed, and 
eventually diminished; by what types of institutional the depth and stability of ownership 
centralization is affected; how changes in the institutional environment induce changes in ownership 
structure of SMEs etc. In sum, with more efforts to be made in future research, we can expect to see a 
more comprehensive and concrete suggestion on ownership transition of China’s SMEs. 
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